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Abstract: 
By design, human resource information systems (HRIS) hold confidential and sensitive information. Therefore, one 
needs to ensure the security of these systems from unintentional mistakes that may compromise such information. 
Current systems design and training procedures of HRIS unintentionally help reinforce unsecure behaviors that result 
in non-malicious security breaches. Measures to improve security through design and training may only occur by 
breaking the use/impact cycle that individuals have habitually formed. Using strong contexts and cues allow trainers to 
interrupt individuals’ habits. Then, they have the opportunity to enforce the repetition of the desired behavior. This 
paper introduces a model of habit formation from consumer behavior that one may apply to HRIS. 
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1 Introduction 
Organizations have increasingly begun to use human resource information systems (HRIS) to capture, 
store, and use data about their employees. A HRIS is “a system used to acquire, store...analyze...and 
distribute information regarding an organization's human resources” (Kavanagh, Thite, & Johnson, 2015, 
p. 17). HRIS also include the interaction of people, policies, procedures, and data to manage the HR 
function (Hendrickson, 2003). As such, HRIS include a great deal of sensitive and confidential data about 
employees (e.g. social security numbers, medical data, bank account data, salaries, domestic partner 
benefits, employment test scores, and performance evaluations) (DeSanctis, 1986; Kovach & Cathcart, 
1999). The more employee information in each data record, the more valuable the record becomes for 
malicious agents. For that reason, aggregated data from HRIS are designed to be shared among only an 
appropriate, approved audience, and system features are designed to help force good practices. Thus, 
the risk of a security breach presents significant challenges for human resources and employees. 
Organizations can be liable for identity theft caused by these data breaches and employees can be 
stigmatized if negative personal data leaks.  
For this reason, organizations need to protect their employee data as effectively, if not more, as their other 
corporate data. Several studies have focused on how to educate employees and to develop more 
effective and secure acceptable use policies (CITES). Despite this, a high number of serious security 
breaches continue to plague organizations (Ponemon, 2012). Thus, clearly, one should consider other 
factors such as interface design and unconscious employee behavior as well.  
Right or wrong, humans’ repeated behaviors guide them. What one chooses to focus on and do over and 
again soon fades to something innate and unconsciously executed. Unconscious habits form the center of 
human behavior (which holds true in our personal and professional lives, for trivial and non-trivial tasks, 
and for secure and unsecure behaviors. Yet we have largely underestimated and misunderstood such 
habits (Martin, 2008). Organizations hope to ingrain correct, secure behaviors in their employees through 
policy and education, but these procedures may be contrary to unsecure behaviors they repetitively 
reinforce. Thus, a favored quote by professor and historian, Will Durant, has more salience: “We are what 
we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.”. Here, we may relax the notion of 
“excellence” and instead be satisfied with “correct, secure behavior” by employees.  
Traditional research in human-computer interaction (HCI) has examined the design and usability 
components of technology as intended rather than the use/impact cycle (Zhang & Li, 2005). The 
use/impact cycle concerns how individuals and organizations actually use technology and the related 
impact they have on them. By under-emphasizing the use/impact cycle of technology, researchers have 
predominantly ignored the impact that unconscious behavior may have. In this work, we present a 
behavioral model, along with propositions that build on existing theory, to guide future research in this 
area. We expressly examine secure and unsecure behaviors in the context of HRIS due to their criticality 
in organizations. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the importance of privacy and security for 
employee data and how organizations have responded to security concerns. In Section 3, we review 
existing research in the areas of security and habit-based research and the consciousness of behavioral 
intention in HCI. In Section 4, we present our research framework, which builds on the Martin-Morich 
model of consumer behavior (Martin & Morich, 2011). In Section 5, we discuss determinants of habitual 
behavior and present a series of propositions guide future research. In Section 6, we discuss the results 
and, in Section 7, conclude the paper. 
2 Background 
Given the growing concern about identity theft and the security of employee data in HRIS, some states in 
the US (e.g., Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, and 
Washington) have passed privacy laws that require organizations to adopt reasonable security practices 
to prevent unauthorized access to personal data (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015). 
Despite these new laws, in one survey, 43 percent of businesses confessed that they did not put any new 
security solutions in place to prevent the inadvertent release or access to employee data, and almost half 
of them did not change any internal policies to ensure that data were secure (Ponemon, 2012). A clear 
example of this practice is when the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) experienced a data breach 
that exposed millions of records (Eng, 2015).  
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According to another study, almost 40 percent of all security breaches in organizations are non-malicious 
in nature and typically result from complacency or negligence (PRNewsWire, 2014). As for why, it may be 
possible that non-malicious behavior is closely tied to cues from the interface (both software and 
hardware) and the nature of the interaction that employees have with HRIS; it is possible that the interface 
and technology interaction contribute to complacency in employees. A particular result of such interaction 
is the use of weak passwords, a major culprit of security breaches (Ives, Walsh, & Schneider, 2004; 
Zviran & Haga, 1999). As systems grow more complex, HRIS password requirements grow in terms of 
strength and incorporation of non-meaningful items. Unfortunately, employees may find it more natural to 
continue using weak passwords.  
From a human-computer interaction (HCI) perspective, recalling a strong password is a tough task 
(Grawemeyer & Johnson, 2011). Essentially, information security relies on designing solutions that work 
diametrically opposite to the way employees’ brains work naturally. It is important to avoid unaided recall 
wherever possible because it places a burden on a person’s cognitive load and ability to perform (Sweller, 
1994). As a result of this cognitive overload, an employee may default to some unconscious behavior that 
ultimately results in an error or security breach.  
Though employees receive education on proper procedures and HRIS systems feature conscientious 
design features, employees still engage in unconscious behaviors that are unsecure. For example, 
employees who are logged into HRIS may absentmindedly plug unauthorized USB drives into their 
computers and, thus, cause a chain reaction that leaks sensitive employee data without realizing it. In 
another common example, due to stringent HRIS password requirements, employees may write 
passwords on a piece of paper stuck on the side of their monitors. Thus, unconscious behavior can defeat 
the best efforts of security and design experts. In other words, all of the security protocols in the world are 
powerless in the face of a stressed-out worker (Bandyopadhyay, Mykytyn, & Mykytyn, 1999; Greitzer & 
Frincke, 2010).  
We consider unconscious behaviors here as synonymous with habitual behaviors because something 
done repeatedly becomes ingrained (Verplanken & Van Knippenberg, 1998). Once that behavior becomes 
habitual, deliberate intentions have less impact to the point of irrelevance (Triandis, 1979). Thus, HRIS are 
particularly prone to creating habit-based security risks at the individual or enterprise level based for 
several reasons: 
1. HRIS contain the type of information that employees are likely to access from multiple devices 
and locations.  
• Employees access these systems when dealing with various life events (i.e., 
births/deaths) and often do so away from the work setting. 
• The frequency of accessing data from various networks will likely create routines that will 
lead to habitual behavior. 
2. HRIS contain the type of information that employees often access under stressful conditions. 
• Personal information is needed immediately after an accident or when an employee’s 
loved one is ill or injured. 
3. HRIS passwords are typically complicated. 
• Complexity increases the likelihood that employees will write their passwords on a piece 
of paper or store them electronically on their computer or phone. 
• Employees need aids to reduce cognitive load. 
4. Many HRIS functions are done routinely, which creates habitual behavior. 
• Employees execute habits without the need for conscious-level processing, which 
increases the likelihood of unsecure behavior (e.g., clicking on a link simply because that 
is what the user is used to doing).  
• Attempts to force employees into conscious-level processing may create frustration and 
compensatory behavior outside of information-security measures. 
Further, by combining information from multiple databases and applications, a breach in one system is 
likely to create a breach in all systems and, thus, elevate an organization’s risk. 
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3 Literature Review 
This section comprises two parts. The first part presents relevant IS security and habit-based research. 
The second part references HCI literature regarding design-related behaviors and conscious and 
unconscious behavior. 
3.1 Security and Habit Research 
Since HRIS users interact with information systems on a regular basis in their organizational activities, 
how they use the systems and whether they follow established measures will ultimately determine the 
overall security of an organization’s HRIS. Fundamentally, traditional security research has a “behavioral 
root” (Workman & Gathegi, 2007) and is a subject of psychological and sociological actions of people. 
Most prior research in traditional organizational IS security—which is relevant to HRIS —has dealt with the 
success and failure of security policies by using a deterrence approach (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010; Chen, Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013; Herath & Rao, 
2009; Straub & Nance, 1990). 
A limited amount of work has investigated HRIS security. Zafar, Clark, and Ko (2011) looked at 
differences in perception between management and staff about HR security risk management in two 
companies. They found statistically significant differences in one of the companies and state that an 
organization’s HR, information technology (IT), and executive branches need to effectively collaborate. 
Noting this gap, researchers have begun to develop conceptual frameworks of both a managerial and 
technical nature to enhance this field (Lippert & Swiercz, 2005; Noor & Razali, 2011; Zafar, 2013).  
Habit-based research in IS mostly focuses on continuing technology use as an act that conscious (non-
habitual) decision making drives (De Guinea & Markus, 2009). However, habit research also draws from 
literature in psychology to posit that much of continuing technology use is habitual. The argument is that, 
when technology use is habitual, an individual’s intentions ceases to guide it (Thorngate, 1976).  
Research has identified habitual IT use behavior in IS as repeated behavioral sequences that are 
automatically triggered by cues in the environment (Cheung & Limayem, 2005; Kim, Malhotra, & 
Narasimhan, 2005; Limayem & Hirt, 2003; Limayem, Hirt, & Cheung, 2007) and considered it to be a 
critical predictor of technology use (Kim & Malhotra, 2005). Using a moderation perspective, Limayem and 
Cheung (2008) illustrated that the predictive power of intention weakened with continued habitual behavior 
by individuals. Venkatesh, Thong, and Xu (2012) integrated habit into the unified theory of acceptance 
and use of technology (UTAUT) to complement the theory’s focus on intentionality as the overarching 
mechanism and key driver of behavior. They modeled habit as having both a direct effect on use and an 
indirect effect through behavioral intention.  
Research has also pointed to the role habits play when warnings users ignore warnings or routinely 
acknowledge notifications. For example, users click through half of all Secure Sockets Layer warnings in 
less than two seconds, which is consistent with warning fatigue (Akhawe & Felt, 2013). Further, 
employees’ brains stop registering the novelty of security notifications due to the routine nature of clicking 
on similarly presented notifications over time (Anderson et al., 2015; Anderson, Vance, Kirwan, Eargle, & 
Jenkins, 2016). Research has also investigated the concept of warning and alert fatigue in clinical 
settings, which demonstrates the widespread applicability of habit formation (Kesselheim, Cresswell, 
Phansalkar, Bates, & Sheikh, 2011). 
Studies have used various proxies for habit. For example, Kim and Malhotra (2005) equated past use to 
habit. Limayem and Hirt (2003) introduced a self-reflective measure of habitual IS use as a viable 
alternative to past use. Some have used a “response-frequency measure” for habitual tendencies toward 
the choice of a certain travel mode (Verplanken, Aarts, Knippenberg, & Knippenberg, 1994; Verplanken, 
Aarts, & Van Knippenberg, 1997; Verplanken, Aarts, Van Knippenberg, & Moonen, 1998). In terms of their 
psychometric properties, research has not compared these measures to each other. Benbasat and Barki 
(2007) have called for more research on habit, while others have called for alternative theoretical 
mechanisms in predicting technology use to extend research in this area (Bagozzi, 2007). 
Researchers have also investigated the interplay between compliance and habits. High propensity for 
compliance has been associated with high degree of security. Vance, Siponen, and Pahnila (2012) 
integrated habit with protection motivation theory (PMT) to explain compliance. The authors concluded 
that habitual compliance with security policies strongly reinforced the cognitive processes theorized by 
PMT. Interestingly, due to its general nature, other researchers who have investigated vulnerability and 
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severity in relation to compliance with security policies have used PMT (Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007). 
3.2 Consciousness of Behavioral Intention in HCI 
Behavioral intention is often the focus of HCI as well. Researchers focus on where the user intends to 
move or what the user intends to select as captured in purposive and functional computing (Shneiderman 
& Plaisant, 2005; Yoo, 2010). They encourage designers to match the user’s mental model of behavioral 
intention with what one expects from a system’s layout, affordances, and responsiveness (Preece, Sharp, 
& Rogers, 2015). This recommended match implies that users can consciously access their mental maps 
and is reflected in popular elicitation techniques such as “talk aloud” and interviews. Thus, HCI questions 
have largely reflected the measurement tools available. Further, the field suggests that we may get closer 
to a match by incorporating users into the design process on the front end as with user-participation and 
user-centered design (Iivari, Treiblmaier, & Galletta, 2012) or by including system training on the back end 
(Santhanam, Yi, Sasidharan, & Park, 2013). 
Increasingly, the field is appreciating the impact of unconscious processing on design assessment and 
individual performance with a system. Human-computer interaction researchers have examined 
aesthetics, emotion, and mood in conjunction with system use where they have found positive 
associations to enhance performance and perceptions (Cyr, Head, & Ivanov, 2006; Loiacono & Djamasbi, 
2010). In addition, the neuro-information systems (neuroIS) subfield has shown the benefits of using 
neurophysiological tools and techniques to complement traditional psychometric tools to reflect 
unconscious processing (Dimoka et al., 2012; Riedl, Davis, & Hevner, 2014; Tams, Hill, Ortiz de Guinea, 
Thatcher, & Grover, 2014). The adoption of neuroscience-based tools into the IS field is still rather 
nascent and relegated to a limited community with access and knowledge of these tools. The knowledge, 
however, is accessible to all through the results of behavioral and social science research. 
Overall, traditional HCI frameworks have largely considered interaction from a perspective of new use 
rather than integrated behavior, and we need a shift in paradigms as our interaction types have shifted 
(Lyytinen, 2010). With new use, individuals have not yet formed habit, which resides at the conscious level 
of mental processing. However, technology use is pervasive in our organizational and personal lives, and 
we must better appreciate how our unconscious, habitual behaviors affect our system use. In Section 4, 
we offer a model for application in the IS field for understanding habit and HRIS interaction. 
4 Proposed Framework 
Compelling research from diverse fields including neuroscience; cognitive, social and behavioral 
psychology; and behavioral economics reveals that most human behavior predominantly results from 
unconscious mental processes. When a person is in a familiar situation doing repetitive tasks, behavior 
rapidly becomes automatic and less open to conscious control. This research challenges the conventional 
wisdom embedded in most models of human behavior that posit humans are rational agents who make 
conscious decisions (Martin, 2008; Martin & Morich, 2011; Wood & Neal, 2009).  
The impact of these research streams to HRIS security is profound. All security assumptions at their core 
assume that employees can follow directions that require conscious attention to behaviors performed in 
highly habitual settings. From this perspective, it seems logical to assume that explaining the policies to 
employees should be sufficient to obtain compliance. Yet, we argue that unconscious employee behavior 
causes a high percentage of security breaches, which is immune to all appeals that rely on conscious 
mind attention and control. We propose adapting the Martin-Morich model of consumer behavior (Martin & 
Morich, 2011) shown in Figure 1 to model employee consumption of HRIS. Such a model serves as a 
basis for understanding how we may develop an improved approach to HRIS information security 
achieved through more-informed interface design and training. 
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Figure 1. Martin-Morich Model of Consumer Behavior 
We elect the Martin-Morich (2011) model over alternatives such as Lewin’s (1972) three-step model for 
change. Lewin assumes that organizations operate in a stable state and that most of the projects 
undertaken are small scale in nature (Burnes, 2004). Cummings, Bridgman, and Brown (2016) further 
expand on the nature of Lewin’s assumptions. Martin-Morich (2011), on the other hand, assume that 
individuals form true habits when they understand the complex sequence of cues, contexts, and feedback. 
Such complexity seems most reflective of IT contexts, which feature continuous change. Further, our 
proposed model incorporates newer insights gained about human behavior from social science research 
overlain with cognitive neuroscience. 
5 The Determinants of Habitual Behavior 
Habits are automatic behaviors that cues activate in a stable context independent of goals and intentions. 
They are quick to activate, do not require conscious intervention, and are persistent (Wood & Neal, 2009). 
Such behaviors are quite similar to the “system 1” thinking described by Kahneman (2003), who also 
supports the premise that an individual’s cognitive response changes based on content and context. The 
proposed model posits a dynamic process where both the conscious and unconscious minds participate in 
guiding decisions and behavior. One’s conscious mind more heavily influences decisions and behaviors 
that are novel or occur in unfamiliar situations. However, decisions and behaviors that one makes 
repeatedly in stable contexts become increasingly habitual. We designed the model to more closely reflect 
real-world experiences where something that gets the attention of the conscious mind can disrupt habitual 
behaviors and even highly complex behaviors can become habitual with sufficient repetitions.  
Training is a common method to raise consciousness of proper security measures in an organization 
(Bulgurcu et al., 2010). For a new employee, training presents an unfamiliar situation in which to 
consciously practice sound security procedures. It is logical to think that employees may then repeat these 
sound security procedures and, thus, make the correct behavior habitual. However, one can see an 
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example of how habits can instead sabotage information security training in spear-phishing where emails 
and other message forms use specific information about an individual to trick people into lowering their 
guard and compromise a system (Hong, 2012).  
While employees consciously know that they should not click on suspicious emails but are tired or 
stressed, they are likely to automatically click on an email that looks normal. For example, the OPM data 
breach exposed personal information on more than 21 million people, including information on people who 
were included in background checks but never became federal employees (Eng, 2015). One could use 
this information to design spear-phishing attacks that could easily defeat the reliance on an employee’s 
conscious-level vigilance. Administrators of HRIS would be high-priority targets due to their access to the 
most valuable personnel data. 
5.1 Strength of Habit 
According to the Martin-Morich model (Martin & Morich, 2011), behaviors occur along a continuum of 
consciousness from primarily conscious to primarily unconscious (see Figure 1). The following describes 
each of three modes experienced along this continuum. 
“Pilot” mode: novel situations focus the conscious mind’s attention as do situations perceived as unusual 
or risky (e.g., a good example is when employees need to learn a new or updated software program). 
Conscious processing takes effort (Kahneman, 2003). As with passwords, tasks that require significant 
amounts of conscious effort routinely encourage employees to find shortcuts or workarounds to relieve 
their cognitive load (Sweller, 1994). 
The two most popular passwords in 2014, unchanged from the several years prior, were “123456” and 
“password” (Condliffe, 2015). Websites and applications that require eight character passwords with at 
least one capitalization, one number, and one special character (i.e., passwords specifically hard for the 
human brain to remember or “strong” passwords) force employees to create password lists on their 
computers or write them down on a piece of paper. 
“Co-pilot” mode: individuals who periodically encounter situations in which they can choose a decision 
among a small set of alternatives often develop heuristic processing. For example, employees often have 
annual decisions to make regarding contributions to retirement plans or charitable giving or selecting a 
healthcare plan. Rather than fully consciously evaluate each option, employees are likely to develop an 
informal rule that guides behavior, such as choosing the option recommended by the employer or simply 
electing the same plan options as the previous year.  
“Autopilot” mode: behaviors that individuals repeat in similar situations create automatic habits that they 
execute without the need for conscious level goals, intentions, or oversight. Even complex behavior, if 
repeated enough times, will become habitual. Experts in an area develop a type of “neural efficiency” in 
which they exhibit lower activation levels and more concentrated areas of brain function (Neubauer & 
Fink, 2009). This neural efficiency allows streamlined thinking as with Kahneman’s (2003) “system 2”; 
habits make behavior highly efficient and allow one to multitask in a way that cannot happen with 
conscious behavior. Because conscious processing takes effort and does not allow for multitasking, 
shifting behavior to habits is critical to efficiency. For example, employees often use their email systems 
as an informal filing system storing not only emails but also attachments. A similar set of habits have 
emerged around using multiple devices to access corporate email with mobile phones and tablets used 
unthinkingly to access and send emails (Cecchinato, Cox, & Bird, 2015).  
Therefore, we posit: 
P1:  One can enhance HRIS security by incorporating design and implementation practices that 
focus on the unconscious part of the behavioral spectrum. 
5.2 Context and Cue 
Habits form when one repeats a behavior in a similar situation, which becomes a context linking behavior 
to particular tasks that one needs to do (see Figure 1). The unconscious mind determines contexts based 
on perceptions of familiarity. Contexts can be very narrow (e.g., only making online purchases from a 
home computer) or broad (e.g., purchasing online from a mobile phone across any network). Once one 
creates a context, it provides the framework in which the habit functions. Most HRIS security training 
programs recommend that one look for clues such as misspellings or unusual requests to click on a link to 
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detect malicious emails. Malicious emails can potentially allow privileged information to leak to non-
authorized sources, which amounts to trying to create a new context for employees: a malicious email 
context. It is easy to see why this education fails because individual do not encounter malicious emails in 
a stable situation. Indeed, the sender is trying very hard to make the email look like it belongs to the 
employee’s familiar context.  
Once an individual creates a habit in a context, a cue can activate it. Cues can be crafted to launch a 
behavior, such as the beep or vibration that signals an incoming text, or can form organically, such as the 
smell of fresh popcorn. The cue launches the behavior automatically, which eliminates the need for 
conscious processing to initiate behavior. Unintentional HRIS security lapses often happen when 
something cues a routine behavior as perhaps one learned in training in what appears to be a normal 
context.  
Therefore, we posit: 
P2: One can enhance HRIS security by designing systems that create strong contexts and cues.  
5.3 Behavior and Feedback 
Behavior goes through the same process as habit formation. Novel situations create new behaviors that 
conscious intention often guides. With repetitions over time, the behavior comes under the control of 
unconscious systems. This process is accelerated by reinforcing feedback and retarded by punishing 
feedback. HRIS security training assumes that education or information will lead to correct behavior and 
induce learning. However, as the model illustrates, the dynamic process of behaviors repeated over time 
leads to mental efficiency via transference of those behaviors to unconscious control. Such unconscious 
control cannot be overcome  
Therefore, we posit: 
P3:  One can enhance HRIS security by focusing on repeating correct behavior as part of the HRIS 
training process. 
The final sections describe implications for practitioners and researchers for how to incorporate desired 
behaviors into unconscious control via enhanced systems design and revised training procedures. 
Although with humans there will always be unexpected responses, employees working with HRIS should 
generally follow the Martin-Morich model (2011) for their behavior. Thus, if we hope to effect changes in 
behavior, we must break the use/impact cycle that individuals have habitually formed. Using strong 
contexts and cues allow one to interrupt others’ habits. Then, one has the opportunity to enforce the 
repetition of desired behavior. 
6 Discussion 
Researchers wishing to undertake this agenda may design studies that incorporate more traditional 
psychometric tools, neurophysiological tools, or both. Inherently, a study will be longitudinal in nature to 
allow for the repetition of desired behavior to occur. During the pre- and post-tests participants, one may 
observe and survey participants and record their neurophysiological responses. However, we must note 
that, in recording neurophysiological responses, one creates a new context for the participant that will not 
mimic an everyday situation; most individuals do not conduct business wearing an electrode cap that 
records their brainwaves or have an eye-tracking device incorporated into their laptop to monitor the 
diameter of their pupils 
After one administers a pre-test, training would begin. One should present and repeat different scenarios. 
During behavioral repetition, to reinforce desired behavior, one should provide strong cues alongside 
feedback for correct and incorrect behavior. For example, research has extended reinforcement used in 
“clicker training” with animals to humans (Pryor, 2009). For example, one could have a chime or click 
sound when a participant correctly indicates suspicion of an email with a suspicious URL in it versus no 
sound if the participant indicates nothing is amiss. The opposite would happen for a legitimate email. This 
repeated process would help reinforce desired action in the face of activities that threaten security when 
interacting with HRIS. 
Practical implications of this work encourage managers to incorporate such repeated drills into training 
procedures that consider preferred actions in light of different security scenarios. One could also 
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incorporate stronger cues into HRIS to counteract risky behavior. Once practitioners appreciate the need 
to modify existing systems design and training procedures to counteract unconscious behavior, they will 
reinforce desired security behaviors and significantly reduce the risk undesired behaviors can have.  
Such examinations have begun under a bourgeoning “neurosecurity” subfield (Anderson et al., 2015). 
This subfield of IS security research borrows knowledge from cognitive neuroscience as the Martin-Morich 
(2011) model presented here does. In proposing the Martin-Morich model, we help extend existing habit-
based research in IS security with that in consumer behavior to help improve the security of HRIS. 
7 Conclusion 
Unconscious habits form the center of human behavior, yet research largely underestimates and 
misunderstands them. Many breaches occur when users are not consciously aware of what they are 
doing. Also, contrary to recent headlines, not all threats in the cyber realm are malicious in nature. 
According to a Ponemon study, 70 percent of American survey respondents and 64 percent of German 
respondents stated that unintentional mistakes caused more security incidents than malicious acts 
(Ponemon, 2015). The study also considers the security, education, training, and awareness (SETA) 
programs that organizations have implemented. We contend that most unintentional mistakes result from 
habitual behavior that promotes an automatic response. Previous research supports the idea that 
automated behavior results from the force of habit (Jasperson, Carter, & Zmud, 2005; Kim et al., 2005; 
Ouellette & Wood, 1998). However, no one has investigated this issue in HRIS and HCI in any context. To 
better address this issue, we provide a framework that others can use in the future to investigate the role 
unconscious habits may play in the security of a HRIS. 
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